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Unity Out of Difference
BY THE HONORABLE WILEY

B.

RUTLEDGE*

The creative thing in this country, the miracle of America, is that
out of diversity and out of differences we have created unity. E Pluribus
Unum-I wonder whether we sometimes altogether realize, emotionally
as well as intellectually, what that means. It does not mean "Unum"
without "E Pluribus." Unity without difference is no miracle. Unity
without difference is death, or dictatorship, despotism. Unity out of
difference, a contradiction in terms, is as miraculous as the conception of
the Trinity.
It means to me the very essence of democracy. It means that we
could not have democracy if we all were alike. We could not have democracy if all of us were in agreement. It means that we must have difference,
division, disagreement, in order to achieve the unity which makes us one
in a manner which is different from the unity which makes other people
under other forms of government one.
And therefore for me the essential principle of democracy is not any
conception of equality of men or inequality of men. For me the essence
of democracy is the right to differ and to be respected in differences. That
goes for you, and by "you" I mean the advocates of all causes. That goes
for capital and for management. It goes for labor and its leaders. It
goes for the man so often ignored when those terms are used, the middle
man, the consumer. The principle means that he who holds the management and the control of financial power in his hand is not always right.
It means that he who holds the forces of labor, organized or unorganized, in his hand, is not always right. It means, too, that the consumer is
not always right. But each has an equal right, an indispensable right, to
state his view as he sees it and to fight for his advantage by whatever
legal and legitimate means the society in which he struggles may afford
at the time.
This necessarily means also that at some stages in the evolution of
society one case will be presented better and more effectively than the
*Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Address delivered at the
forty-sixth annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association, Colorado Springs, September 17, 1943. (The introductory remarks of Mr. Justice Rutledge have been omitted.)
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other, that the ballot will swing in this direction or that or the other.
But that ballot is never a final ballot. When a final state of things is
achieved, when we reach the situation in which any of the major interests in our economic, social and political structure becomes secure so that
it cannot be affected by opposition, by the tensions and the strains of
opposing forces, then we will no longer have a democratic community.
And so down at the bottom of things, back beyond all the legal
formulas that we have created and that through the ages have come to us
-- due process of law, equal protection of the laws, the law of the land,
all our legal formulations of the principles of equality and democracybeyond them must reside in the spirit and in the minds of the people a
willingness and a freedom to differ. At the same time I exercise my own
right, I must concede the same right even to the person whose interests
at the moment seem too great. But there is one limit the essential character of our structure always requires, that whatever may be the maladjustment of particular controversies, the sum total of the adjustment
will be accomplished by democratic procedures. If in the great stresses
and strains of changing times any interest achieves the power to defy
accommodation to all other interests in the community by peaceful and
by lawful means, then we reach the limit, the point at which not only
the democratic ideal, but the democratic institution itself is in danger.
I am not one, frankly, who adheres to the philosophy that revolution is
never justified. If I were I perforce would be compelled to repudiate
Thomas Jefferson and all those who wrote our own Declaration of Independence and achieved the reality which it declared. There are times in
the history of men and of nations when the legal forces and powers of a
nation array themselves so thoroughly upon one side of a great social
conflict that the other side, morally though not legally, may be justified
in seeking relief by extralegal means. That necessarily is a Jeffersonian
principle. But it is one to which resort should be had only as a matter of
last accommodation, and then only to resolve the most fundamental
social conflicts.
Short of that, short of a situation in which the legal arrangements
are intolerably secured by some powerful interest in the community
which refuses accommodation to all others, the essence of the democratic
process is that each interest shall submit itself to the rule of law.
I am not one who divorces law from justice. I remember the last
political convention in which I participated. Perhaps it is appropriate
to refer to it now. Linda Lee was our justice of the peace in Boulder.
She was always nominated by both parties, and elected by the unanimous
suffrage of her community. God rest her soul! The last time we renominated her, when the expected had taken place, she arose to express her
thanks. She said, "Ladies and gentlemen of the convention: I thank
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you for the nomination. I appreciate your support, and I promise you
that in the future as in the past I shall run my court on the basis of
justice and not law!" She did. The two, generally speaking, I believe.
do not differ. But there are instances, as we all know, when they clash.
When this is true, except in the rarest cases, it is better for the citizen, in
his own interest and in the community's interest, to accept what he regards as an unjust determination in preference to rebelling against the
system of adjudication. It takes an awfully rotten system of justice to
justify a revolution. And therefore we lawyers should be patient with
the people, because they do not always understand what they regard as
our injustices, and we should appreciate and support them because they
accept so much of our own imperfections. In short, an imperfect system
of law is generally, upon all but the rarest occasions, to be preferred to
the most perfect system of force.
Now I come to the application of that principle in its most important field for the future.
Do you realize how short a time it is we have been a nation? I
suppose we would count it from 1776; it will not be long until we will
be celebrating the 200th anniversary of that year. Two hundred years,
two centuries, twenty decades-what is that as history goes! What is
that when compared with the growth of the British nation under its
present institutions? Even before the Norman period those institutions
were developing, ripening toward the future. But our two centuries of
national life are only an interlude between two eternities. If we think in
somewhat shorter terms, we really have not been a nation, a solidified,
unified nation, a nation in which there is a unity we knew would not be
broken, a union in which the bond could not be and would not be severed, for longer than half that time-not half that time.
And if one thinks a little farther, how long has there been a Germany; how long an Italy; how long a Russia of continental dimensions:
how long a China, other than merely an aggregation of men and groups,
loosely and disjointedly connected?
We are in an age of nationalism, and it is not an old age. Actually,
the real force, the real power and the real principles of nationalism are
hardly more than a hundred years old. Before that men gave their allegiance to other men, to kings and princes and principalities. They were
not powers, they were little unions, tiny aggregations, not empires-growing into empires, of course, because through the history of the last
thousand years there has been a force that has been drawing men more
and more together and compelling them to unite in larger aggregates and
more complex structures. We have become so imbued, so impregnated
with the nationalistic idea during the last century, and particularly the
last fifty years, and with its logical outgrowth, the imperialistic idea,
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that we do not realize it is a very young, a very immature, a very adolescent notion.
The old sovereign loyalties were loyalties to persons. The ancient
loyalties were to feudal structures, not national in character. Those
structures were the ones on which the nationalistic structure grew, which
it succeeded and replaced. If one wishes history for authority, we should
find feudal, not nationalistic society as the pattern for the future.
But there was a force operating in the world too big for feudal
vessels to hold, one which burst out from their confinement. It was not
primarily a political force or a legal one. It included and comprehended
these, but there was something deeper, vaster and more fundamental than
any mere legal power or any political power on the face of the globe. It
was the inventive genius of man, his ever-ascendant struggle to conquer
the physical universe in which he lived. His success in that struggle began
-no, it did not begin with the invention of gunp6wder. We do not
know when it began, but that event was an enormous step forward.
With that creation of physical power and its evolution, the world has
shrunk into a smaller and smaller unit. Men refined this force, devised
implements for its use, and it shrank the earth, bringing men out of the
bow-and-arrow stage into stages of even closer connection.
The feudal structure was built upon the idea of impregnability, of
standing defensively in a particular spot. Its essence was localism. It
went down, not because men decided they wanted a new political system
or a new legal system or because their rights were unjustly created and
defended. It went down because men used the power of creation born
within them to subdue and bring out of nothing physical forces which
the world traditions and established institutions could not resist.
When we emerged from the feudalistic stage, we began to create the
life of states. On this continent we did that when our country was thirteen. And we decided to perpetuate the idea, not in the number thirteen,
thank God, but in the basic notion of a union or league of states-forerunner of a nation. Our first effort was nothing more than a loose league
of little nations; and it failed, because we did not realize even then how
far the unifying forces of man's inventiveness had brought him. But
soon we began to comprehend, for we are a practical people and when
we find something does not work we devise something else. And so we
arranged a larger and a more powerful union. We subjected our states
to law as before we had subjected men to law.
Men still resort to force. But they do not do so except with the
permission or under the penalty of the law. There is no room now in
our society for the individual outlaw. We have abolished the institution
of outlawry. Nor is there room within our nation for the outlaw state.
Coming as I do originally from the South, with ancestors on both sides
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of southern origin, I know that the issue of the Civil War inevitably was
to make what had been a league into a nation, an entity worthy of all
of our loyalties, superior to any local loyalty to which individually we
are attached.
All through these years has that process, physical and legal, advanced. We may have assumed that we and the other nations of the
earth had attained our ends. We have not. There is a fatalistic and
cynical philosophy, which I fear still has great vitality, that the idea of
law for the world is impracticable, is unworkable, that it cannot be done.
As a man of law, as one who believes in revolution only as the last
recourse against long-continued and gross injustice, as one therefore devoted to the legal principle, I maintain that there is no limit in human
society to its application. It is a principle that imperfect law is better
than perfect force. That principle has validity among men, between you
and me, between you and your neighbor. It has validity between states,
between Massachusetts and Virginia, between Kentucky and Coloradobetween even Kansas and Colorado! It has validity also between this
nation and other nations.
It is valid now, not only because of its inherent validity as a principle, but because we have had twice demonstrated within twenty-five
years that the only other alternative will not work! We are not alone;
we do not live by ourselves; we are no longer free to decide that question
exclusively for ourselves; we live in a world in which. others also have
the power to make that decision for us. I am not proud of the way it
was made the last time. I give due credit for sincerity and patriotism to
those who then thought we did not need to act, who felt we could remain aloof. They did not read the facts aright. They did not see that
we live in a world which is constantly shrinking, each day growing
smaller and smaller, drawing men together, subjecting you to my influence and me to yours, so that the man in Tokyo today is not as far away
as the man in Boston was from the man in Charleston in 1776.
With that physical shrinking of the universe, with the expansion
of man's power over distance and over space and over all of the forces
that go with their conquest, there is another thing to be remembered even
in Colorado, even on the Western Slope, with all your apparent security
of physical isolation. The only real security for the future is in the
expansion of the basic principles of our profession, the one step which as
yet has not been taken. That is security in law, in the legal organization
of human institutions, so that there may be law not only among men
and among states, but also among nations. I assert that if we do not
create law, in the sense we lawyers know it, and not as a mere abstract
idea or moral principle-unless we create laws among nations, with sanctions to enforce it as lawyers enforce law among men, as we enforce law
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among our states, we shall not maintain much longer the semblance of
law among ourselves or among our citizens. For by now it should be
clear that we cannot have law at home with anarchy rampant abroad.
We can have only the semblance of freedom here when international
conflicts not only disrupt our peace-time activities but threaten to disturb
our whole social structure every score of years.
The chance for us is really one of two things: to take our full
place as men of law in the creation of a legal structure for the world that
will keep the peace among nations; or to maintain ourselves in a state of
perpetual disorder which will crush any possibility of the maintenance
of free institutions within this land. We have the choice to adjudicate
or to fight whenever fighting may be forced upon us. I lay it down as a
premise of the essential legal structure that it must be shared and participated in by every power on earth capable of disturbing the earth's
peace. It would be silly, laughable, if we in Colorado should say that
the law applies to everybody but Dudley Hutchinson and Dexter Blount.
We do not create law that way. We place all men under restraint of law.
That is one thing we mean by equality before the law. We do not make
men equal, but we place them equally under legal restrictions. We place
the states of our Union under the same equality of legal restraint. And
we make no exception--neither Idaho nor Kentucky, not even Texas,
can stand independent of the power of the United States of America.
If Texas were outside the Union, more especially if Texas and the region
west of the Mississippi could defy the Union, what kind of a nation
would we have? Likewise, if we leave out of the legal structure of the
future the Soviet republic or the German nation or the Italian people or
the Japanese nation, if you leave any power, any force, out of that structure which is capable of disturbing the peace, and therefore the law of
the world, you foredoom it to failure, at the least to the experience which
we ourselves had, culminating in our Civil War, the necessity for resort
to arms eventually to establish the rule of law.
One in my place cannot speak too closely about the present. But
there are some fundamental things even judges can say. I think there is
almost universal agreement in this country today that we do not want
to repeat what we have done twice in twenty-five years. I think there is
almost universal agreement that if we are not to repeat those experiences
we must create some kind of a legal structure which will be effective to
restrain any power which can threaten the peace and the law of the
world. But I am not so sure we have set our hearts so solidly on that
desire or our minds so clearly on the main objective that we may not
back out of it. The greatest danger, in my mind, is not the conflict of
arms in Europe, in the South Pacific and in the other arenas of this military conflict. The greatest danger of this nation is that it will divide
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itself again over the way, the method, the how we shall do what we all
agree should be done. I pray God that will not happen. For, if we
divide, there is little chance that the rest of the world will be able to
create a force able to offset our own withdrawal.
So if I have a word in summary to say to you, it is: yes. let us
discuss, let us debate, let us talk, let us differ. But let us do all this in the
spirit of the men who framed our fundamental law. Most of them
stayed to the end and saw the thing through. A few went home; great
men they were, but shortsighted. Even Patrick Henry opposed the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, he who sent out that great
lawyer's cry, the call to arms for freedom. Patrick Henry was a farsighted statesman when he did that. But I fear he was neither statesman
nor seer when, in querulous timidity over the details of our constitutional plan, he refused to accept it. Let us not repeat his mistake.
If the plan, whatever plan may be offered, seems imperfect; if it
involves risk, if it involves danger, remember two things. First, any plan
will involve risk and danger. And no plan at all will involve more risk
and more danger, in my judgment, than almost any plan that could be
devised.
In the second place, law is never perfect. I like to think of that old
adage lawyers frequently use, a government not of men but of laws. It
is a half-truth, not a whole-truth. All of us know there was never a
government on earth that was not a government of men. All laws have
their expression and their application through human action. But the
truth in the aphorism for me is that however imperfect law may be at
its best, still the man who applies it shall not apply his personal whim
or preference, but shall give effect to the great tradition of his community
as it has been determined in preceding ages and as it may fit, as nearly as
possible, the conditions under which he lives. That conception of a government of laws but not of men does not mean an inhuman or a nonhumane government. It means a government as nearly impersonal, as
nearly lacking in whimsicality and partiality as possible, though not one
which disregards the human factor or attempts to operate above or
beyond human power. So let us recall that however imperfect the first
proposal may be, however hard the compromise which may be required
to secure the consent of others whose viewpoint is not necessarily our
own, we will not be the first who have made compromises, we will not
be the first who have surrendered some part of independence, we will not
be the first who have given up a portion of sovereignty to achieve greater
law and greater freedom.
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Lawyers on the Scrap Pile
EDITOR OF DICTA,

Sir:

In the October, 1943, DICTA there is an article entitled: "Are
Lawyers Performing Services Essential to the Community or for the
War Effort?"
I am sure lawyers will qualify under item (17) : "Persons engaged in scrap business."
Some of our clients will vouch for the fact that we will also qualify
under (12) (d) "Workers at * * * extractive establishments."
HARRY C. GREEN.
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The Validity in Colorado of Marriages
by Proxy
BY EDWARD

H. SHERMAN*

Marriages by proxy or through the mail may seem incredible and
subject to derision, but no longer are they confined to the scrutiny of a
classroom in domestic relations. With so many of our soldiers abroad
the validity of such marriages has become a matter of great importance.
Our problem may be stated thus: In Colorado may a soldier
abroad enter into a valid marriage with his fiancee, who is in Colorado,
by proxy or correspondence or in any other manner where the parties
are not in each other's presence? Basically, this will depend upon
whether the mere presence of the parties at the time of making a contract
of marriage is an essential element to the agreement between them.
Prior to the decision of Ex ParteSuzanna, 295 Fed. 713 (D. Mass.
1924),' the validity of a marriage by proxy or agent had never been
judicially determined either in the United States or in England. Such
marriages were, however, upheld in the legal systems of many European
countries. Marriages by proxy were permitted in England until the
eighteenth century and became probably a part of the common law of
this country.
In an article published in the Harvard Lat' Review in 1919,2 Professor Ernest G. Lorenzen concluded that such marriages are valid in any
state of the Union where common law marriages are recognized.
Toward the end of the first World War the Judge Advocate General of
the Army gave his opinion that a marriage by letter was valid. 3 In an
bpinion announced by a federal court in 1918, it was decided that marriage, like any other contract, may be effected by correspondence alone.4
Further authorities may be added to Ex Parte Suzanna upholding such
*Of the Denver bar.
'The Suzanna case held that a marriage by proxy in Portugal, where such marriages
are allowed, between a woman resident in Portugal and a man resident in Pennsylvania,
was valid in any state where common law marriages are recognized.
'Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws ( 1919), 32 HARV. LAW REV. 473.

3

But the following appears in DIGESTS OF
bid. n. 488. EDITOR'S NOTE:
OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY, 1912-1930 (1932),
S. 476, p. 227:
"A written contract between a soldier of the American Expeditionary Forces in
France and a woman of Cook County, Illinois, recites that the contracting parties recognize each other as man and wife. The purpose of the contract was to legitimize a child
previously born to them. The War Department can make no authoritative ruling as
to the validity of the purported marriage. Unless it is followed by a ceremonial marriage, as required by Illinois Laws, 1905, p. 317, it will not Ibe recognized as valid in
Illinois. 291.1, Jan. 8, 1919."
'Great Northern Ry. v. Johnson, 254 Fed. 683, 166 C. C. A. 181 (8th, 1918).
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marriages when celebrated in a jurisdiction that recognizes common law
marriages.-- Generally, as to a marriage ceremony, the law of the state
where the celebration took place is the law which governs its validity.
Are there established principles of contract and agency, unshaken by
considerations of public policy, to uphold such marriages in Colorado?
MARRIAGE BY PROXY

By Colorado statute marriage is considered as a civil, contract to
which the consent of the parties is essential.6 We have two general ways
of making a marriage: First, the solemnization in the form prescribed
by statute, and second, an informal contract which requires no ceremony
nor solemnization. Colorado law recognizes the validity of common
law marriages. Our statute prescribing formalities for solemnizing marriage does not otherwise nullify a valid informal marriage. 7 Created by
an informal contract, a common law marriage may be by parol or in
writing, without ritual or form, expressed in any manner the parties
desire. All that is required is capacity and the expression of present consent. May an agent make a contract of marriage for his principal which
will be upheld as a common law marriage? If such marriage can be
created by contract alone, established by satisfactory proof thereof, there
is no reason why such contract cannot be made by an agent for his principal. If, however, in addition to the contract itself we require cohabitation or habit and repute as further elements to constitute a valid common law marriage, then obviously an agent cannot make such a contract,
for these elements involve personal factors and would require the presence of both parties.
It is true that there is a conflict of opinion by the courts whether a
valid common law marriage may be created by an agreement alone, without consummation or cohabitation. 8 While there are a number of cases
in which the court by its language purports to require cohabitation, it
will be observed that in nearly all of them the facts in the case actually
showed cohabitation and the statement was dictum. 9 For a case to be
considered as a precedent on this question it would seem that there
should be present no evidence of cohabitation. While some courts regard
this difference of opinion as a difference in measuring the quantum of
proof necessary to prove a common law marriage, it is in a few cases a
rule of substantive law. Actually, the cases are rare which expressly hold
that cohabitation is essential to the validity of an informal marriage.
U. S. v. Tuttle, 12 Fed. (2d) 927 (E. D. La. 1925) ; Silva v. Tillinghast, 36
Fed. (2d) 801 (D. Mass. 1929): U. S. v. Commissioner of Immigration, 298 Fed.
103 (S.D. N. Y. 1924).
04 1935 C. S. A.,.C. 107, S. 1.
'Taylor v.Taylor, 10 Colo. A. 503, 50 Pac. 1049 (1897).
33 A. L. R. ANNO. 27 (1924).
'KOEGEL,COMMON LAW MARRIAGE (1922), 116, 138.
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They are based on the theory that marriage is a status which cannot be
obtained until the parties have publicly assumed the relationship either
through a ceremonial marriage or have cohabited and publicly held
themselves out as husband and wife. But this view violates the historical
concept that if a mutual agreement in fact is clearly established by direct
evidence, neither holding out nor cohabitation is necessary to constitute
the parties husband and wife. ' Most authorities agree that under the
common law marriage may be created by agreement without cohabitation. Cohabitation and a holding out add nothing to a legal marriage,
but are merely evidence from which a marriage may be presumed. Logically this is the proper view, for since "cohabitation" nmeans not merely
sexual intercourse but living together as husband and wife and entails a
lapse of time sufficient to enable the public to judge the relations of the
parties, there would be sexual intercourse before the marriage is completed, and this would surely be contrary to the real purpose of the
marriage laws.- 1
Our supreme court has not been unaware of this conflict. In Peters
c.Peters, (Re Peters), 73 Colo. 271, 215 Pac. 128 (1923), 33 A. L. R.
24 (1924), it recognizes this conflict and takes the position that the
habit and repute of marriage are not essential but merely evidence of the
essential--consent. 2 Marriage is a contract to be established as any
other contract. Evidence that the parties conducted themselves as man
and wife is some evidence of such a contract; evidence that they did not
is some evidence against it. By the same token consummation or cohabitation are merely evidentiary facts of consent.
a Itis true that prior to Peters .,. Peters, the Colorado supreme court
and the court of appeals used expressions that would seem to require the
elements of cohabitation or habit and repute in addition to proof of the
contract. Klipfel's Estate u. Klipfel, 41 Colo. 40, 92 Pac. 26 (1907) ;
Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Colo. A. 303, 50 Pac. 1049 (1899) ; Employer's
Ins. Co. v. Morgulski, 69 Colo. 223, 225, 193 Pac. 725 (1920). But
in the Klipfel case there was no marriage ceremony or any express contract of marriage, and petitioner based his alleged marriage upon evidence
of cohabitation and reputation (page 44). While in the Taylor case the
specific holding was that no marriage was ever contemplated and the
relations between the parties was wholly meretricious, in the Morgulski
case evidence of cohabitation was resorted to merely to show the consent.
101 BISHOP,

MARRIAGE,

HARV. LAW REV. (1914)

DIVORCE

AND SEPARATION

(1890),

S. 315;

27

378 n.; Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 161 Eng. Reprint 665

[2 Hag. Cons. 54 (1811)]; 2 KENT, COMM. *86; 2 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (16th
ed. 1899)

S. 460;

1 RUTHERFORD, INST. 345:

1 BL., COMM.

*433;

1 BISHOP,

supra, SS. 239, 313, 315, 317.
"L. R. A. 1915 E (57 L. R. A., N. S.) ANNO. 8, n. 25.
2
Followed in Moffat Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 108 Colo. 388,
Pac. (2d) 769 (1941).
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Thus, in one case the expression of the court was used to state a
proved or admitted fact, while in the others, the contract of marriage
was sought to be proven by cohabitation and habit and repute, and the
court merely stated that the cohabitation of the parties, or their reputation, is evidence of a marriage.

We believe that in Colorado, marriage, though the most solemn of
all contracts, is yet but a contract.- Proof of the contract alone is sufficient to constitute a valid common law marriage, but where the contract
is denied or cannot be shown, or is based upon an implied understanding,
14
mutual assent may be inferred from cohabitation or repute.
If marriage is but a civil contract, made in the same manner as other
contracts, there is no reason why it cannot be entered into through an
agent. The mere presence of the parties at the time of the agreement is
not essential to the formation of an agreement.' Nor can we logically
say that the formation of such a contract is so personal in nature, or so
immoral, that it cannot be delegated to an agent. The mere making of
the contract is not personal in nature; only the status resulting therefrom
is personal. If a general authority were given to an agent to select a
spouse for one, at the agent's own discretion, it would be invalid, 1
Meechem, Agency (2nd ed. 1914) S. 126. Then it would be analogous
to marriage brokerage contracts, which are uniformly regarded contrary
to public policy. But a special authority given, and especially during
war time, should be valid if the marriage contract is no different from
other contracts.
Suppose our soldier in Australia, prompted by religious reasons,
desires a church ceremony and in a form prescribed by statute. May he
solemnize such marriage with his fiancee in Colorado through an agent
who appears for him at the ceremonial marriage?' 6 Failure to conform
0f course an informal marriage may be invalid for other reasons: viz., incapacity
of parties; that the mutual promises are not consistent with the essentials of marriages.
There must be more than a promise to live together; the relation must be mutually exclusive of marriage with someone else. Taylor v. Taylor, supra note 7. There must be
an expression of present consent. In re estate of Danikas (Ryan v. Cordas) , 76 Colo.
191, 230 Pac. 608 (1924).
It cannot be a contract for future marriage. Radovich v.
Radovich, 84 Colo. 250, 269 Pac. 22 (1928).
1In support of its holding in Peters v. Peters, supra p. 285, the court cites the
leading American cases for the view that cohabitation and habit and repute are not necessary to constitute a valid common law marriage: viz., David v. Stouffer. 132 Mo. A.
555, 112 S. W. 28 (1908), and Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 69 N. W. 31
(1896), but in these cases cohabitation was a proven or admitted fact and the discussion was dictum. The doctrine has been upheld expressly in Great Northern Ry. v.
Johnson, supra note 4 (also cited), and in Jackson v. Winne, 7 Wend. 47 (N. Y. Sup.
1828), 22 Am. Dec. 563 (1881), and U. S. v. Simpson, 4 Utah 227, 7 Pac. 257
(1885).
'Great Northern Ry. v. Johnson, supra note 4: Ex Parte Suzanna, supra p. 283.
"0 We note in the Denver ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 27, 1943, that a marriage was thus solemnized in Denver, the groom being represented by his father, who
held a power of attorney.
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with the formalities prescribed by statute should not affect the validity
of such marriage as a common law marriage.'7 But we believe that such
a formal marriage ceremony ought to be sustained as a formal marriage
prescribed by statute, for if our statute does not expressly require the
personal presence of both parties there is no reason why an agent may
not go through the formalities of making a solemn contract for his principal. The only difference between a formal marriage as prescribed by
statute and a common law marriage is in the method of expressing
consent."'
Nowhere in our statute is the personal presence of the parties required. The application for marriage license need be made by only one
of the parties; premarital examinations need not be made in Colorado
nor filed in person, 4 1935 C. S. A., C. 107, S. 5. It has been contended
that the requirement of personal presence of both parties can be found in
the certificate of marriage, which recites that the officer has solemnized
the rites of matrimony of A and B in the presence of two witnesse's, ibid.
S. 12, but the certificate does not state that A and B were personally
present. In this form the ceremony itself is the thing attested by witnesses, not the personal appearance of the parties. It is axiomatic that
statutory regulations of marriage are construed as directory only and are
interpreted merely as directions to the solemnizing officer."' Indeed, since
in Colorado marriage rests upon the fact of consent, it would follow
logically that marriage might be contracted by proxy, although neither
of the parties was present when the consent was exchanged by the parties.
Further problems might well be suggested: What under our law is
the proper mode of appointing an agent to execute such a formal contract for his principal? If marriage can result from an informal contract
no particular form of appointment should be required. The agent's
authority may be conferred orally or in writing, provided it can be
sufficiently proven and clearly discloses the principal's intention, the
identity of the agent and what he is to do."'
If the agent makes out the application for license and must acknowledge it for purposes of representing his principal in a solemnized marriage ceremony, perhaps he should have written authorization verified by
his principal. We doubt that failure to verify such application will invalidate the marriage, once the agency is proven.
Surely, it is advisable that the agency be conferred by writing and
verified, and should clearly disclose the principal's intention, identify
the agent and prospective spouse, and should show what the agent is to
1739 A. L. R. ANNO. 538 (1925)

: Taylor v. Taylor. supra note 7.
"SCatlett v. Chestnut, 107 Fla. 498, 146 So. 241 (1933).
1l BISHOP, op. cit. supra note 10, SS. 403, 423-449.
'2 C. J. S., S. 26, p. 1055. An agent need not have written authority to make
a simple written contract.
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A seal is not necessary.

The agent's authority should be clear and

decisive.1
MARRIAGES BY CORRESPONDENCE OR TELEPHONE

If Colorado recognizes common law marriages without requiring
cohabitation or personal presence as essential elements thereof, then an
American soldier abroad should be able to enter into a valid marriage by
mail if the one to whom he addresses his offer of marriage accepts it in
Colorado. Surely, it would be simpler to create the marriage status by
the exchange of consents through the mail. Great Northern Railway v.
Johnson, supra note 4, expressly holds that a marriage by correspondence is valid if valid by the law of the state from which the acceptance
was sent. It has been stated that under the correct common law doctrine
a valid marriage might be contracted by mail.2 2 Indeed, if a marriage by
proxy is recognized under the common law there is no reason why we
should require personal presence for a marriage created by correspondence. Marriage being but a civil contract, the rules to be applied should
be the same as are applied to ordinary contracts. Personal presence of the
parties should add nothing to the formation of their agreement. By
what law will the validity of such marriages be governed? Under established principles of conflicts of law the law of the place of celebration will
control the validity of a marriage. This will be where the contract is
made. As to an ordinary contract the general rule is that the place where
made is the place where the acceptance is mailed. Thus, if the acceptance
were mailed in Colorado, the marriage should here be valid. While marriage creates a status there is no reason for applying a different rule.2 3 In
predicting that our court would uphold such a marriage we are guided
by Peters v. Peters, where the court followed and rested its position upon
the authority of the Great Northern Railway case.
By the same token marriages by telephone should be valid in Colo-

rado, at least they should be upheld as valid common law marriages. An
informal contract may be made over the telephone. 24 Such marriages undoubtedly would be subjected to the keenest scrutiny of our courts. The
vagaries of war may justify unique ways of contracting marriages, but

public policy will require the clearest proof of such contracts. What law
will govern such a marriage? Applying the rule as to ordinary contracts,
it would seem that the place from which the accepting party speaks
"1Thus, in Hawaii v. Li Shee, 12 Hawaii 329 (1899), the court held that assuming the marriage by proxy was valid, there was no proof that the proxy was given or
that the alleged husband consented.
21 BISHOP, op. cit. supra note 10, S. 325: SWINBOURNE, ESPOUSALS (2d ed.)
162, 181-183.
"Coad v. Coad, 87 Neb. 290, 292, 127 N. W. 455, 457 (1910). This was
the reasoning of the Great Northern Railway case, supra note 4.
2'17 C. J. S. 400, n. 77.
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would be the place of celebration. If, therefore, made in Colorado, it
should be valid. There is more doubt whether our courts would uphold
such marriage as a ceremonial one prescribed by statute. Elsewhere it
has been held that an oath cannot be administered by telephone, 25 nor
can a wife acknowledge her husband's deed over the telephone.2'
But if our statute does not require the personal presence of both parties, as we have contended, and if its prescribed formalities are merely
directory, as the Colorado supreme court has held, such a marriage should
be sustained as a valid ceremonial marriage. Our argument is that a
marriage by telephone, and its preliminaries, may so be arranged that it
will comply substantially with the prescribed statutory form. It should
then be accorded recognition not as a common law marriage, but as a
valid statutory one.
It may well be that by upholding such marriages we are making
more uncertain and formless the one contract which ought to be the
most formal and certain. However, such marriages may furnish the only
devices available for our soldiers abroad to contract marriages. So far
as the logic of our law is concerned such marriages should be valid. It is
for our legislature to say whether they should be forbidden upon grounds
of public policy.
'Sullivan v. First Natl. Bank, 37 Tex. Civ. A. 228, 83 S. W. 421 (1904)
Carnesv. Carnes, 138 Ga. 1, 74 S. E. 785 (1912).
But see Banning v.
'Wester v. Hurt, 123 Tenn. 508, 130 S. W. 842 (1910).
Banning, 80 Calif. 271, 22 Pac. 210 (1889), and Abernathy v. Harris, 183 Ark. 22,
34 S. W. (2d) 765 (1931).
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"Criminal Code" Recommended
BY THE HONORABLE JOSEPH

E.

COOK*

Sometime late in July your president, Edward L. Wood, asked me
to head a temporary committee, the primary purpose of which would be
to make recommendations concerning revision of the so-called "Criminal
Code" and criminal procedure in Colorado.
We had discussed the matter intermittently during the spring, and
had met once in informal conference with Stanley H. Johnson, Kenneth
W. Robinson and Ralph L. Carr to consider the advisability of such a
move. The unanimous opinion of this little group seemed to be, "Let's
go ahead."
Next came the question: How should we determine the sentiment
of bench and bar? And again: What would be the proper agency to
undertake the job?
It was not until early August that we decided to sound out sentiment. We sent letters to all the district judges, to all the district attorneys of the state, and to a representative group of lawyers, about twenty
in number, who had also been named to the temporary committee by
your president. The full committee list and the replies from members
are on file with the report of the temporary committee.
Only three in each group failed to respond. In strong proportion,
the remainder answered that our substantive criminal law and procedure
are in need of some revision at this time. They further said that the
Colorado Bar Association was the logical agency to do it.
You'll be interested to hear some of the suggestions concerning the
proposed revision.
Of course, strictly speaking, we do not have a criminal code in Colorado. The substantive law is made up of a body of statutes, passed by
the legislature, sometimes hurriedly, sometimes under pressure, and
thrown piecemeal into the existing structure. Except for amendments
offered by district attorneys here and there, to bridge gaps and to
strengthen statutes and penalties already in force, and by groups interested in special legislation, no effort has been made to study the whole
code, and to cast it into modern mold to meet present-day needs. All
seem agreed that piecemeal amendments are not satisfactory.
Concerning special existing statutes, some members of the committee felt burglary should be broken down as between daytime and nighttime, the latter being the offense under the common law; and that
*District Judge, Second Judicial District of Colorado. Report of temporary committee for revision of the criminal code and criminal procedure in Colorado, made to
the 1943 annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association, at Colorado Springs.
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breaking and entering a dwelling should be considered a more serious
offense than entering an office building, a mercantile establishment or an
empty schoolhouse. Others have felt that the larceny statute, with
twenty dollars as the dividing line between grand and petty theft, and
with the confusion and multiplicity of the laws governing automobiles,
is outmoded and should be cleared up.
We have had much complaint about the uniformity of sentences,
or the lack of it. Many believe the sentencing function should be taken
from the courts and placed in a board of correction. The board, they
say, could make a complete study of the individual prisoner, of his habits, aptitudes and background during the first months of his incarceration.
It could study his reactions to prison life, and determine the time which
might be required to readapt him to the social stream. The Federal Judicial Conference of the Committee on Punishment for Crime strongly
recommends such an arrangement, though it concludes that the sentencing function should remain in the courts. Certainly, the effect of the
present uneven sentences in most jurisdictions is apparent, and is one of
the most serious obstacles to good prison morale.
Other members of the committee decry short term jail sentences.
They point out that most county jails are not only overcrowded, but are
often unsanitary---offer no outlet for physical, mental or emotional energy, and often afford a breeding ground for vicious habits. They say
county farms or workhouses should be erected, or if already in operation,
should be made available for prisoners serving misdemeanor sentences up
to one year. They believe these prisoners should be allowed compensation for their work, and that their families should benefit therefrom; or,
having no families, that the prisoners be allowed thereby to build up
financial reserves, looking toward the day of their release.
Colorado has a statute, buried in the Children's Code, which makes
mandatory the erection of a workhouse for men convicted of nonsupport. The number actually convicted is quite small, and the statute
should be enlarged and extended to include all misdemeanants, and it
should be enforced. Certainly a county workhouse or a county farm,
or a combination of the two, would be most desirable, and should pay
for itself eventually.
Some provisions of our adult probation law have come in for
criticism. Many say the approval of the district attorney should not be
required, and that Colorado is unique in this respect. Others say that by
the very nature of its functions and purposes, probation in its operation
should be divorced from law enforcement officers. Our law has been in
operation a comparatively short time (since 1931) and we have made
considerable progress since then. It may be that further study by a permanent committee of this association will disclose there is still much
room for improvement.
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To discuss our parole system seems almost superflous. We have
none. No one knows better than our good warden, Roy Best, how hopelessly inadequate it is, and no one in the state has cried out more loudly
than he for an effective parole law. Every prisoner discharged from
Canon City should not only have some reserve of clothes and money,
but should have employment waiting, and should have understanding,
well-trained parole officers to guide him over the rough spots for upwards
of two years. Otherwise, history of nearly all cases shows the prisoner
returns to the old haunts, friendless, penniless, jobless, and with the
stage all set for him to renew his criminal career.
And, certainly, it seems to me we need a broader base and greater
flexibility in the law for treatment of youthful offenders.
Trditionally, we have relied upon punishment, and the threat of
punishment, as the only way of defeating crime. This is not only logically unsound but historically ineffective.
It has not been successful in preventing first offenses, nor has it been
effective in heading off recidivism. The possible consequence of punishment to certain types of personalities, perverted in their conceptions, may
act as inducements rather than deterrents, in the opinion of the committee of the American Law Institute, which drafted the Youth Correction
Authority Act. Where physical abnormalities are concerned, certainly
prison confinement offers no amelioration.
And finally, punishment does not take into account the causal factors of crime, and generally returns the prisoner to the same community
-to the same environment, not only no better equipped for absorption
into the social stream, but often more handicapped than before.
We must lay more emphasis upon studying the criminal, and less
upon the crime. We must be concerned less and less with trying to fit
punishment to offenses, and more and more with fitting treatment to
individuals.
We recommend to the consideration of any permanent committee
which might be named by this association, a study of the Youth Correction Authority Act, under which young offenders from sixteen to
twenty-one, instead of being sentenced to penal institutions, are committed to a correction authority for vocational, industrial and educational
rehabilitation, as their aptitudes and interests justify. We recommend
also for study the Report to the Federal Judicial Conference of the
Committee on Punishment for Crime, and a Critique of Criminal Prosecution in Colorado, by Stanley H. Johnson, former district'judge in
Denver. And since two committee members have suggested a "Public
Defender" law for Colorado, we can refer you to the California act as a
model for study.
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Concerning young women, we have been negligent in the matter of
providing either a reformatory or any correction authority whatever.
In lieu thereof, the practice has been to commit the less serious female
offenders to any county jail that may be handy. We needn't comment
upon the lack of foresight and the utter hopelessness of good results in
any such policy.
District Attorney Burke has wisely suggested, we think, that statutory adjustments might be made committing these young women to the
State Industrial School at Morrison, which has been eminently successful
in reclaiming girls under sixteen.
Other suggestions made by the committee include advance notice of
the defense of alibi, and pre-sentence investigations, as embodied in the
proposed new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Some lawyers have found fault with the ambiguity of the Habitual
Criminal Act; and others think we should amend the statute defining
insanity, and providing for pleas thereunder. Still others believe exceptions should automatically be saved in criminal cases.
In closing, let us point out that Louisiana has recently amended its
criminal code, and that the outstanding accomplishment of the framers,
in the opinion of District Judge John R. Pleasant, was the reduction of
some 504 statutes, and parts of statutes, into a compact and practical
code of 142 articles. One article in plain and simple language, Judge
Pleasant points out, replaces all of the previous statutes on larceny, embezzlement and false pretenses; makes penalties consistent, and substitutes one offense of theft for seven statutes relating to various types of
embezzlement, thirty-three relating to larceny and eighteen on false
pretenses.
We could do much the same in Colorado in similar situations. And
let it be remembered that not all our criminal statutes are embodied in
volume two 1935 COLORADO STATUTES ANNOTATED. They are scattered throughout all the volumes.
A resolution adopted July 19, 1943, by the General Interim Committee of the Thirty-fourth General Assembly of Colorado importunes
the Colorado Bar Association to appoint a committee or committees to
study the constitution and statutes of Colorado "for the purpose of finding obsolete and unnecessary statutes or parts thereof, and recommending
their repeal or revision."
Your committee feels that a study along all the lines indicated
would be productive of benefit to the state.
We think a modern criminal code is highly desirable in the battle
against crime. We realize it will mean long and careful research; and
one of our members has suggested that if a permanent committee be set
up, it should include in its ranks one experienced annotator, a highly
skilled legislative draftsman, and an executive secretary.
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Speeches of Rutledge and Lilliston Highlights
of Annual Bar Meeting
District Judges Discuss Preliminary Draft of
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
By WILLIAM HEDGES ROBINSON, JR.
Highlighted by the addresses of Associate Justice Wiley B. Rutledge
of the United States Supreme Court, and W. F. Lilliston of Wichita,
Kansas, the forty-sixth annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association
held in Colorado Springs, September 17 and 18, 1943, was attended by
over one-third of the practicing lawyers in the state. Chief items of
interest on a vital two-day program were the symposium on war legislation and its effect on property rights, the legal clinic held for army legal
assistance officers and lawyers, and a skit presenting some of the outstanding features of the proposed Model Code of Evidence.
The two-day bar meeting was preceded by a conference of district
court judges, presided over by Judge John L. East of Trinidad. Chief
subject of discussion by the judges was the preliminary draft of the
FederalRules of Criminal Procedure.
Officers selected for the forthcoming year were John L. Clark of
Glenwood Springs, president: Benjamin E. Sweet of Denver, presidentelect; Charles Rosenbaum of Denver, senior vice-president; Earl Bryant
of Montrose, W. W. Gaunt of Brighton, and Chester B. Horn of Colorado Springs, vice-presidents; Vernon V. Ketring of Denver, treasurer,
and Win. Hedges Robinson, Jr., of Denver, secretary.
Declaring that the greatest danger from the present war would be
the failure of this nation to participate in a world plan to enforce world
peace, Justice Rutledge said that the "only security. for the future is in
the expansion of the basic principles of the legal profession-security in
law and in the legal organization of human institutions so that there
may be law not only among men and among states, but law also among
nations. We cannot have law at home when we have anarchy abroad.
We can have only the semblance of freedom here when international conflicts disturb not only our peace-time activities but threaten to disturb
our whole social structure every score of years."
In a delightful satirical address, Mr. Lilliston dissected Mussolini
and Hitler, and left their mangled remains quivering from his barbs.
He pointed out, however, that there are democracies and dictators on
both sides of the conflict and stated that we are fighting for the "personal liberty of self-commending men, the castle that is our home, the
shrine that is our fireside and the privacy of private property and private
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enterprise. We are fighting for that fifth freedom-the freedom of every
man to be unequal according to his merits."
After summarizing the tasks of the Colorado Bar Association during the past year and particularly with reference to war work, Edward
L. Wood of Denver, retiring president, called upon the lawyers not to
relax their efforts to strengthen the association. "The stronger we become as a bar organization, the sounder will be our individual position
at the war's end. This means a better place in life for those who return
from the war. This much we owe to our members in the service."
Major Milton J. Blake, Chief Legal Assistance Officer, J. A. G. D.,
spoke to the association concerning the legal assistance plan in action.
Following his talk, legal assistance officers in the area held a conference
in conjunction with members of the lawyers war emergency committee.
Attending this meeting, among others, were Col. Frank E. Shaw and
Col. Neal D. Franklin, Staff Judge Advocate, Fourth District, A. A.
T. T. C.
One of the outstanding committee reports presented to the association was that of the Lawyers Emergency Committee, headed by Benjamin E. Sweet of Denver, which reported that it arranged a conference
of all legal assistance officers of the Seventh Service Command and the
Fourth District Air Force Technical Training Command to implement
the legal assistance program, and that it had devised an induction notice
and property guide for inductees and enlistees now used in this area,
besides aiding the navy in its varied programs. Other committees reporting on the war work included that of the Legal Aid Committee under
chairmanship of S. Park Kinney of Denver, which stated that legal aid
bureaus for civilians and service men were functioning in Denver and
Pueblo.
A traffic court survey conducted by that committee under the direction of Truman A. Stockton of Denver revealed that outside of Denver
there is an urgent need for a new method of disposal of traffic cases and
great need to eliminate the fee system in justice court proceedings. Following the report of this committee, James P. Economos of Chicago,
Chairman of the Junior Bar Conference, commented on the need for a
thorough overhauling of traffic court organizations all over the United
States.
Discussion of minimum fee schedules by Carl Cline of Denver
aroused considerable interest, and while there was a general agreement
on the premise of the committee that "unless lawyers receive a reasonable
compensation for services, leadership furnished by the bar is bound to
decay," there was no agreement on the method of securing adequate compensation to justify studious and painstaking efforts by lawyers in the
disposition of legal matters.
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The temporary committee on revision of criminal law and procedure, under the leadership of Judge Joseph E. Cook of Denver, urged
that a modern criminal code be devised by the lawyers and adopted by
the legislature as an effective weapon against crime.
Other committee reports suggested the establishment of a judicial
council, the further study of the Model Code of Evidence, and the plan
for uniformity in real estate title practice in the state and an agreement
with realtors concerning the limits of their authority.
Section meetings of the association revealed that the water section,
and the real estate, probate and trust law sections had drafted and were
drafting model statutes in their fields. The district attorneys association
devoted most of its time to a discussion of problems engendered by the
war. A section on taxation was organized at this meeting.
While entertainment was not on the scale of previous conventions,
the Law Club of Denver was above par with its presentation of Follies
of the Jealous Mistress by Her Punctilious Paramours. The annual
cocktail party-to say nothing of the private ones-measured up to
past high standards.

Help Wanted for Part-Time Defense Work
The manpower shortage in the Denver area has become very acute.
In the emergency the United States Employment Service has called upon
lawyers to assist directly in part-time defense jobs.
In eastern states, where the labor shortage has become critical, local
bar associations have given very material assistance through organizing
"Victory Shifts" of lawyers and professional men who take four-hour
evening shifts of work in defense industries. The local appeal of the
United States Employment Service is for similar organizations among
Denver lawyers through appropriate committees of the bar association.
Since skilled work requires training, full-time workers only are used
for jobs of that sort. The part-time work for which assistance is asked
is unskilled; in general, warehouse work requiring storekeepers, clerks,
warehousemen and dock hands. Compensation is paid at regular hourly
rates, varying from fifty-seven and a half to seventy cents an hour.
Members of the bar association have already responded generously,
but further assistance is required. Those who can help and who desire
further information should see or call one of the following lawyers who
are members of the War Emergency Committee or the Junior Bar Committee: Mark H. Harrington, MA. 6273: Truman A. Stockton, CH.
3591; Hubert D. Henry, KE. 8127; Charles H. Haines, Jr., TA. 5111.
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Off the Record
By A. H.

WHITE*

(Continued from the October issue)
All of which recalls the question Judge Sam Kinsley, of the El
Paso county bar, asked a young applicant for admission to the bar.
Judge Kinsley said, "How would you proceed to appeal a case to the
Supreme Court?" The young man started to tell in great detail just
what he would do when Judge Kinsley interrupted, saying, "You are
wrong, young man, you are wrong. The first thing you should do is to
consult Jim Perchard."
When Mr. Perchard was promoted from Chief Deputy Clerk to
Clerk of the Supreme Court in 1918, Mr. Henry McAllister wrote Mr.
Perchard, saying, "I'm most happy to see the clerk de facto become the
clerk de jure."
On that occasion Judge Hayt paid tribute to Mr. Perchard as follows: "The opinion of the bar as to Mr. Perchard is correctly given by
Lord Bacon, if we strike out the word 'ancient' from the following:
'An ancient clerk, skillful in the precedents, wary in the proceedings,
and understanding the business of the court, is an excellent finger of the
court, and doth many times point the way for the judge himself."
I'm sure all who knew Mr. Perchard, with one accord, would
heartily join in that tribute.
The supreme court held that clerks of courts should not be included in the constitutional amendment establishing the civil service for
state employees, yet, to the great credit of the court, it has not for more
than thirty years been controlled in the appointment of its clerks and
deputies by political influences. Democratic majorities have appointed
Republican clerks and Republican courts Democratic clerks.
III.
Judge Charles Cavender was a delightful and interesting character.
He came to Leadville from Pennsylvania, a health seeker, in the 'eighties
when that mining camp was at its heyday, and spent the remainder of
his life there. He was a most capable and successful lawyer, served as
judge of the district court in his later years, and was always one of the
leading spirits of the community. He was very fond of Mr. Perchard
and would often call and have a visit when he came to Denver. He
would come into the office in high glee, take a seat in a big chair, cross
his legs comfortably and begin scolding about some recent decision of
*Formerly Clerk of the Supreme Court of Colorado.
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the court with which he did not agree. He never closed his visit without
praising the climate at Leadville as being the best all-the-year-round climate in the state.
This story is told by a Denver attorney who sought to collect an
account against a Leadville business firm. Though not a large bill, he
was compelled to bring suit. The defending attorney delayed the action
by filing about all the motions found in the code, and finally the Denver
lawyer went to Leadville to argue the motions before Judge Cavender.
The motions were being regularly presented when the judge, in his
usual brisk and positive manner, took a recess and invited the attorney
to come to the court chambers. There Judge Cavender asked the attorney as to the accuracy and justness of the account and was assured that it
was a just and legal claim. Judge Cavender then said, "I'll just settle
this case right now," and gave the attorney his personal check for the
full amount of the claim. The attorney said he never knew why, but
thought possibly the defendant was some friend of Judge Cavender's
whom the judge wanted to help out a little when he was possibly short
of funds.
Another Denver attorney tells this story on Judge Cavender. The
judge liked to play Boston, not played much now but popular several
years ago. About the middle of the week Judge Cavender would call
this Denver friend, saying he wanted to come down the following week
end and for the friend to make the arrangements for a game. The judge
came down one Friday night, spent the day, Saturday, visiting friends,
and after a good dinner at the Denver Athletic Club, the game was on.
The game was close and interesting and continued until after breakfasttime Sunday morning. The chips were counted and Judge Cavender was
about $160.00 out. The judge remarked, "Now that was a hell of a
party, wasn't it?'.' and all went home happy.
IV.
Colonel Robert S. Morrison, father of Arthur R. Morrison, was
one of the great characters who practiced law in Colorado in an early
day. He was the author of "Morrison's Mining Rights," the guide book
on mining litigation for a generation, and probably to this day.
One day he was trying a case in Clear Creek County. It was the
habit of the trial judge to read the morning paper while the trial was
proceeding. The attorneys were bickering back and forth and getting
nowhere, when the judge lost his temper and said to the attorneys, "You
gentlemen try this case as it should be tried. You know what is proper
and what is improper. I don't want to be bothered with your objections." Colonel Morrison answered heatedly, "I don't speak to opposing counsel." "Telegraph him, telegraph him," the judge snapped back
and continued to read his paper.
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V.
Forty years ago the procedure in strikes following labor disputes
was for the companies to appeal to the sheriff to appoint all the employees
who were on its side of the controversy deputy sheriffs. Such conditions
existed in the coal mining camps of Fremont County many years ago.
The sheriff was asked to appoint deputies named by the company, but
he was quite reluctant to do so, and sought counsel of Mr. Clyde C.
Dawson, father of Mr. Clyde C. Dawson, now of the Denver bar. Mr.
Dawson advised the sheriff as to his duties, but the sheriff hesitated to
follow the advice, and finally Mr. Dawson became provoked and said,
"Hell, Sheriff, it isn't legal advice you want, it is political advice."
Mr. James T. Locke, of the Fremont county bar, was a native of
that county. When I was clerk of the district court he was district attorney. Being from Missouri, I knew all the former Missourians and those
from other sections of the South. I could speak their language, as it
were. When Mr. Locke was prosecuting a case where the defense was
the usual plea of "self-defense," he would bring the jury list to me, saying, "Now, Archie, I want you to indicate on this list all the Southerners. I don't want anyone on the jury with the exaggerated notion of
self-defense." Though a Westerner, he knew some of the traits of the
old-time Southerner.

One of Mr. Locke's clients, a dear old lady, a timid soul, held a
note and mortgage on which foreclosure had to be made. Mr. Locke so
advised her and she greatly protested, saying it was not right to sue anyone even on a debt, but as that was her only recourse she consented.
When Mr. Locke put her on the stand to prove the note, the usual questions were asked, beginning with, "What is your name?" This quite
confused the old lady, but she answered hesitatingly. Then she was
asked, "How long have you lived in Canon City?" This did indeed
excite and confuse the witness. She looked about the court room, hesitated, and answered, "Ever since you were a little bit of a baby." How
true to life. We all measure time by different events, on a calendar all
our own.
(Concluded in December issue)

Maybe It's Breaking and Entering
"Any baby born to any tenant in this apartment during their occupancy is a violate of the
House rules. Hence, in that event,
said tenant is required to move forthwith."
This notice is the basis for an F. E. D. suit brought against a
tenant on the grounds of disturbance.
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